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Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm* 
Nancy B. Rapoporte* 
[Former Enron CEO Jeffrey] Slcilling offered a hypothesis for what brought 
Enron down, calling it a "perfect storm" of events. 
He  speculated &at questions raised about the quality ofEnron's account- 
ing and about self-dealing caused a loss of confidence in the financial com- 
munity. That led to Enron's debt being downgraded. 
That downgrade, he said he was told by an Enron executive after he left, 
meant Enron couldn't access several billion dollars of baclc-up credit lines. 
A liquidity crunch followed, he said, even though Enron was solvent and 
highly profitable. 
-Laura Goldberg, Horrstoiz CIIroizi~l~' 
* Originally published at 71 F O ~ H A M  L. REV. 1373 (2003). Reprinted with permission. 
** Dean and Professor of Law at the Universiry of Houston Law Center. All views expressed in this 
essay are mine alone, and not those of the University of Houston or in faculty, st&, or administmuon. I 
want t o  th:~nli Enlily Chnn-Ngu).cn, I<elli C.inc. Luddiu Collins. B;Jn D.~;~ran. I'arrick 1:lanxg~n. Jimmy 
t l ~ l ~ ~ r r i s .  Sunn Hlntnnn, hlichclc Hcdccr. Xlorris & Shir1c.i. lhoooorr. Harricr I<ichm.ln, 1utTV.m Nir.1. 
" . . .  
and Michelle WE. I also want to thank the students in my 2002 Seminar on Spcciallrrrrer br Ethicr; Sara 
Alonro Oliver, Justin Berg, Alison Chicn, Doug Du Bois, Trevor Fish, PatriclcFlanagan (who gcn thanked 
twice, because he was also one of the cite-checlcers Tor this article), IGm Havel, Cathy Helenhouse, Colin 
Moore, Sandy Oballe, Kevin Powers. Barry Rienrm, Ron Smeberg, and T i k n y  Toups. 
' Laura Goldberg, Did No IVmrix, SkilIi~rx Says: DEfCnd( HiT Role in Enron Fall HOUS. CI-IllON., Jan. 
17, 2002, nvailnble at http:/l www.chron.com/u;lCDNst0ry.hn/sp~~ia1/nmn/dc0l/l183520; rer nlro 
GoodlclorningAnzericnia (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 7, 2002) (Wl eyer will be on former CEO Jeff 
Slulling. Skilling blames Enron's collapse on an unfortunate collision of events-the perfect storm. Con- 
gressional investigators point our he wa;t at Enron's helm at rhc rime."). Of course, now cveryoncand I 
mean everyone-has latched onto this ''perfect storm" metaphor. See, e.g., Fedrrd Documenc Clearing 
House, Worldcorn CEO John Sidgmore Testifies Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science and Tmsportarion, July 30, 2002, auaihble at 2002 WL 1753183, at '3 (statement of John 
Sidgmore, CEO, WorldCom) ("Scverd factors. . . convrrged ro create, I'll usc Mr. Legcrc's words, a ldnd 
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Of course, we now lmow the e x t ~ a o r d i n ~  combination of circumstances 
that existed at that time which you would not meet again in 100 years; thac 
h e y  should all have existed just on thac particular night shows, of course, 
that everytbing was against us. 
-Second OfEcer Charles Lightoller, RkfS Titalzi2 
I had some misgivings about calling [my boolc] The Pe?@ct Storm, but in 
the end I decided that the intent was sufficiently clear. I use perfect in the 
meteorological sense: a storm that could not possibly have been worse. 
Much has been written about the Enron fiasco, from scholarly article2 to popular 
bool~s ,~  and I'm sure dlat much more will be written about the deals that brought the 
of perfect storm-and 1 guamntee you we did not rehearse this-that ripped through thc rclecommuni- 
cations indurrry."); Fedcrd Document Clearing House, Hnrtnin~g Pntietrt Acce~s to &re: The Ovpact of 
Evce~iiveLitigatioa, July 17,2002, nvnilnblent2002WL 1584492, ar '3 (statement ofRichard Anderson, 
CEO,  The Doctori Company) ("The combination OF these facrars created . . . the perfect storm . . . far 
mcdicd linlri.ity inrurcrr."); Federal Docurnr.nr Clc;iring Housr.. Hor~rr Cu,,,u,itret. u,, E<b,rirlion .,ad il,r 
I ~ ~ v ~ ~ / ~ r c ~ ~  Hol,/~ . z  Hc..zr;>,v ou Ejtroui Lle,~/i t~ l'l,,~i , 1 ~ , 1  it, COJ>!D/~,J,~L.< IY'irI, L , I ( ~ . I  0 , ~  E t ~ ~ ~ ~ l o ~ ~ t r - S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ /  
- ' ,  . 
Pertrioe Plmrr, Feb. 7, 2002, nvitiln6le le~t 2002 WL 203240, at '12 (staremenr of Teresa Ghilarducci, 
Associare Profaror of Economics, Univcrsiry of Norrc Damc) ("The 1990s was rhc perfect storm for 
pensions to increase."); Federal Document Clearing House, US. Smtrjrrdicinry Cornnrinee Ho ld  Henr- 
; ~ ~ g ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ t n 6 i l i g ~ ~ ~ e ~ : L ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ L ~ m e d F r o n t ~ ~ ~ r ~ i ~ n ~ ,  Fcb. 6,2002, nvni[nblent2002 WL 188865, 
ar '1 1-12 (snrcmcnr ofChristine Gregoirr, Anorney Gcnenl, Wahingran Stare) ("In Washington [Scare,] 
wc fccl lilic Enron has bccn rhc garhrring of the pcrfecr srorm. Firsr, they gouged our cansumen and rate 
pnyers with highly questionable power prices last year. And now, sadly, they have defrauded our investors 
and others across rhc nation."). 
Onc af the  coolesr things that can happen to a law professor happened to me after I first published this 
nrricle in the Fordham Lntu Reuirru. I sent a copy ro Sebmtian Junger, author OFTHE PERFE(JT STORM. He 
read it m d  said that I was correct in my undcrstznding of the "perfect storm" concept. Thank you, Mr. 
Jungcr! 
' WALTERLORO, THE NIGHT LNG ON 47 (1987) [hereinafter THE NIGHT LIVES ON]. 
SEIlASTKN]UNGER, Tl-IE PERFECT ST0Rh.L: ATRUESTORY OF MEN AGAINST THE S U x i v  (1997). 
"ee, t.g.. Michelle Chm-Fishel. AjerE>rron: HoroAccorratit~gn,~dSECR./.n~z Cnn Prornote Corporntr 
ilccorn~mbilig IVhilr Re~tori~zgPrtblic Co,~jidnrce, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10965 (2002); Xmothy P. Duane, 
Rcptlntio~iXlitionnle;Lenn~i~~gfiorn the Cfllt$n~inEtrer~, Criris, 19  YALE J. ON REG. 471 (2002); Marisa 
Rogaway, Recnrt Dcue1opnrerr1r.s Proposed Refinns to the Regitlntiorr of40lfk) PLnu ill the Wake of the Enrorr 
Dirmter, 6 J. SMALL 8LEMEllGlNG BUS. L. 423 (2002); Marissa P. Vicaro, Can Reptlntion FnirDirdmrrre 
Sttruive theilftmrmth nfE~tron?, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 695 (2002). 
See, e.g. DIN< 1. BARWVELD, TklE ENRON COLLAPSe: CUTIVE ACCOUNTING, WRONG ECO- 
NOMICS 011 CIUMINAL ACTS? A LOOK INTO THE ROOT CAUSE OFTHE LARGE BANICRUI'TCY IN U.S. 
HlSrORY (2002); ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DWMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON (2002); 
LOREN FOX, ENRON: THE RISE A N 0  FALL (2002); PETER C. FUSARO 81 ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT 
WRONG .AT ENRON: EVERYONE'S GUIDE TO THE LARGE BANl(RU1'TCY IN U.S. HISTORY (2002). 
company down, the arrogance of some of the main players, and the ethical and moral 
issues thar seemed to come to light only after the story brolte in the media.%nron's 
collapse, along with the failures of such other mega-businesses as WorldCom and Glo- 
bal C r o ~ s i n ~ , ~  triggered new legislationu and introduced such heretofore arcane acro- 
nyms as "SPEs" into the general lexicon.' The metaphor most used to describe Enron's 
quiclt descent into chapter 11 has been the "perfect storm." 
That "perfect storm" metaphor irlcs me no end. I maintain, and this essay is de- 
signed to illustrate, thar what brought Enron down-at least as far as we lcnow- 
wasn't a once-in-a-lifetime alignment of elements beyond its control. Rather, Enron's 
%nc of the reasons thar I'm sure more will be written is that I'm worldng an such a project: ENRON: 
COWORATE FIASCOS L THEIR IMPLICATIONS (with Bda G. Dharan). 
'Take a look at the largest bankruptcies, in terms of approximate stated liabilities, in d ~ e  past twelve 
months [2001-021: WatldCom (7102 banltruprcy filing) ($43 billion, including $2 billion more in li- 
abilities discovered afrer the banliruptcy filing); Enran (12101) ($32 billion); NTL, Inc. (5102) ($23.4 
billion); Adelphia (6102) ($18.6 billion); Global Crossing (1102) ($12.4 billion); lllvlart (1102) ($10.2 
billion). See Amctican Banlrruprcy Insrirute, A Lonklrzride theh.Igt~-Cme, 10th Annual Southwctt Banli- 
ruprcy Conference, Sepr. 12-15, 2002; Bill Atldnson, Kntnrt File, Chapter 11 Bnrrknrptry: No. 3 Dii- 
courzter Cites Ifink Eoaon?): Tough Co,,rpttitioa: 'Could,ri Pay the Bilk) Stift hlovr Swpri~t~;  $2 Billion 
Loa~r to AidFinni. Reorgn~timtion, BALT. SUN, Jan. 23, 2002, i r  1A ("Thc Troy, Mi&.-bascd firm listed 
$17 billion in assets and $1 1.3 billion in liabilities. . . . [Allrhough Kmart's banliruptcy is large, it pdus in 
comparison to the largest bnnlcmprcy in history, filed last mond~  by Enron Corp . . . [which] listed $49 
billion in assets and $31.2 billion in debts."); Julie Crewell. GoirrgFor Broke; Crml~! Thcre Goer Another 
Cotnpflny iito Bankniptry. Hozu Did I# Get Hm? (Long Stoqt) Are 1% O ~ I  tht hI~nd? (Dm> Bet on It,), 
FORTUNE, Feb. 18,2002, nunilnble at 2002 WL 2190302; Lorrie Grant, Dimrrnter Hope~fir Fmt Reor- 
gnrrizntiou, USATOOAY, Jan. 23, 2002, at B02 ("Kmarr listcd $16.28 billion in z5sets and $10.34 billion 
in debts."); Andrav Lcclrcy, Bnakrnptcier L e n ~ ~ e l r ~ u ~ s f o n i ~ ~  thc-LztrCjl, CHI. TNB., Aug. 27, 2002, nr,nildble 
at2002 WL 2689322; Alexandra R Moscs, Chern Yell I(wok, &Thomar; Lce ct d., RetnilrrK~~~nrtFiIr~ 
fir Bnrrknptcy: 0A;ciah Plan to Close Some Sto~rs, Reorpnize, ST. Louls POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 23,2002. 
acAl ("[IGnarrl has 510.25 billion in debt."); Chris Reidy, Ifimrt Z~~~~blr~Diroerr tRet~~i lCl~ni~~ inRecord 
C h p .  11 FiIii~g, BOSTON GLOBE. Jan. 23. 2002, ur C1 ("In its bankruptcy filing, I h a n  and its US 
subsidiaries listed $17 billion in total assets at baolivdue and r o d  liabilities of $1 1.3 billion as of the 
quarter ended Oct. 31."); Gary Young, Mnjor BnnknptcieiFiI~d i7z N ~ I U  15rk Citjt, 228 N.Y. L.J. 5 (Aug. 
1, 2002). 
See, e.8.. Sarbnnes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Snr. 745, Corporate 2nd Criminal 
Fmud Accountabiliry Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Scar. 800 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 4 1348, 
1514A, 1519-20) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxleyl; Fra~rreiuorkfir 6 r h 1 1 c i ~ ~ g  the Qz~l l iq  offi~mrrcinllr,f.r- 
r~zntiorr Throt~gl~ hr~provrnzcrit of Ouerright ofthe Anditi>zgProce~~, 67 Fed. Reg. 44964-01 (proposed July 5, 
2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 210.229). 
' If you don't believe me, j u t  do a search in WESTLAW or L W S  on "SPW and see how many 
documents you get, ctpecidly documcnts dared after October 2001, when the Enton disaster began to 
brcali. A search of mnior newoaocr arridct (Westlaw database NPMI) for the turms "soccid ourooec 
, . s. r .  
cntiry" or "special purpose entities" during the year 1999 yielded zero results. The first article in this 
database appearcd in October 2001 and a search of2002 now yields over 328 results (as of the second 
wccli in Ocrober 2002, with more being added daily). 
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demise was a synergisric combination of human errors and hubris: a "Eta~zic'~~ mis- 
calculation, rather than a "perfect storm."" 
I. WHY TITANIC IS A BETTER METAPHOR FOR ENRON'S EVENTUAL 
DOWNFALL THAN IS THE PERFECT STORM 
The story of d ~ e  Tirnnic is well-known. The ship was, at the time of its maiden (and 
only) transatlantic voyage, the largest in the world, carrying a microcosm of society." 
The glitterati of the United States and Europe were on board, as were hundreds of 
immigrants trying to malce their way to a new land. The ship was built with watertight 
compartments that extended from the Iceel up several declcs (some to D Deck and 
some ro E declc); she also had a double bottom for extra protection.13 She was designed 
to float with any two consecutive compartments flooded and even with three of the 
first five compartments (out ofsixteen) flooded,I4 thanlcs to electronic doors that could 
be closed by a single c ~ m m a n d . ' ~  And she was touted as "unsinlcable," at least in some 
press reports. 16 
But sink she did, based upon a series of miscalculations, no single one of which 
might have proved fatal, but all of which, talcen together, doomed the ship. In a chap- 
ter of his follow-up boolc to A Nkht to Re~~zc~nbe~ called The NigI~tLives Ois" Walter 
Lord enumerates the many individual mistdces made that night: 
"' And, no, it wasn't d ~ e  Leonardo DiCaprio movie (TITANIC (20th Century Fox 1997)) that first 
piqued my inrereat in d ~ c  ship's history. I'vc bcrn bsdnated by it for probably thirty or so years. Among 
other things, I'm a member ofthcXtanic Historical Sociery, and I probably own virtually every bookand 
movie about the ship. Ifyou're wondering if I'm a bit obsessed with the ship and its tale, yorire right. Bur 
everyone needs a hobby. 
" I;c ujcd the 7itnnic comparison once before. See, e.g.. M i k  Tolson, TAP Fall ofEr~rot~l'Cot~verric,,t 
tohippbg buyWrtnrr Scnrrdnl Offerr Foddcrjr. IVde Range if Gmrrp~ Seeking rr Sy, tbol jr  Thtir Carfie, 
HOUs. CHRON., Mar. 3, 2002, at 26, nuailable nt 2002 WL 3245488. Others have also made the com- 
parison bcnvecn Enron and thc Etatnnir. See Edward J .  Cleary, Lerrorrr For L,ztuycri Fronr The Enrorl De- 
bacle, BENCH & B .  MINN., Apr. 2002, at 16 (foornores omitted) (quoring George F. Will, irrdignratiotr 
Ourr Enros irJirrt the Begininnirrp. WASH. POST, Jan. 16. 2002) ("Given that Enron cmployee pensions 
were decimated with, as one commentator noted, the employees "lacked in steerage lilre the lower orders 
on the Titnrric, and given that many starc pcnsion funds wcrc among the casualties, both state and national 
public officials will bc forced ra act."); Martha Neil, PamrerrntRirk, 88 A.BA. J. 44 (Aug. 2002) ("The 
collapse of Enron mighr give partners at law firms rnson to ponder another epic disaster: the sinking of 
the Etarric."). 
I' WKrm LOID. A NIGH'S TO REMEMBER 1 (1997) [hereinafter A NIGHT TO REMEMBER]. 
Id. at 174-75. She did not, however, have a double hull. Id. 
I" Id. at 26. 
Id. at 8. 
'"d. at 175. 
"THE NIGHT L l m  ON. I I L ~ ~  note 2. 
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* the calm sea, which meant that the loolcouts couldn't see any waves breaking 
against the bergs;" 
the numerous, apparently ignored ice warnings from ships already crossing 
the Atlantic Ocean that were using the same route as the Titnlzic;" 
the lack of any systematic procedure to deliver ice and weather warnings 
from the Marconi telegraph room to the bridge;"' 
the fact that the lookouts' binoculars bad been lost earlier in the trip;" 
the failure of the Titnlzici officers to urge Captain Smith (or each other) to 
take a more cautious approach to travel, based on the calm sea and rapidly 
dropping temperature;" 
not enough lifeboats for the number of souls aboard;" 
Captain Smith's failure to hold lifeboat drills24 or to do more than a per- 
functory test of the ship's bralung speed and maneu~erabilir~;'~ 
First Wireless Operator Phillips's famous response to an ice warning from 
the CalifDr1zimz (the ship that, according to some accounts, was closest to 
the Tirnlzicwhen it sunlc), "Shut up, shut up . . . I am worldng Cape  ace";'" 
the fact that lookout Frederic Fleet spotted the berg too late to stop the ship 
or otherwise to avoid the berg;" 
First Officer Murdoch's decision to port around the berg rather than ram- 
ming it head-on, a counterintuitive action that might have saved the ship;" 
and 
the CalifDl-rzialzi decision not to come to the aid of a vessel in enough obvi- 
ous distress to fire white distress rockets (apparently visible to the Calz~t-rzilnzj 
crew) at several  interval^.^' 
The list of miscalculations goes on and on.30 But Walter Lord tells it best: 
Given the competitive pressures of the North Atlantic run, the chances 
talcen, the lad< of experience with ships of such immense size, the haphaz- 
Id. at 47. 
" Id. at 48-53. 
'O Id. at 53. 
I' Id at GO. 
"Id.  at 53-54. 
I3  Id. at 72-80. 
'" N I G H T T O  REMEMBER, rrtppm note 12, ar 42. 
"THE NIGHT L I V E  ON, rrtprir norc 2, at 56. 
'"d. at 58. 
"Id.  at 59-60, 
"'Id. at 59. 
"Id .  at 134-59. 
'"And so have I ,  at romc social gatherings, as my very indulgent husband c m  attest. 
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ard procedures of the wireless room, the casualness of the bridge, and the 
misassessmenr ofwhat speed was safe, it's remarkable that the 7itnnicsteamed 
for two hours and ten minutes through ice-infested waters without coming 
to grief any sooner. 
"Everything was against us?" The wonder is that she lasted as long as she 
did?' 
The Pet$ct S to~~n,  on the other hand, describes a combination of meteorological 
bad luclc and human miscalculation, born less of arrogance than of desperation. Granted, 
Billy Tyne, captain of the Andrea Gail, made a fatal mistalce by sailing into the storm,'" 
but he did "what ninety percent of us would've done-he battened down the hatches 
and hung on."33 Although the signs were clear that bad weather was coming, the sheer 
magnitude of the storm was far beyond the experience (or imagination) of any of the 
ship captains in the large area covered by the storm, and each of them had to malce a 
quick decision: 
[The weather bulletin describing Hurricane Grace] reads like an inventory 
ofthings fishermen don't want to hear. . . . Every boat in the swordfish fleet 
receives this information. Albert Johnston, south of the Tail, decides to 
head northwest into the cold water of the Labrador Current. . . .The rest of 
the sword fleet stays far to the east, waiting to see what the storm does. 
They couldn't make it into port in time anyway. The Contihip HoNal~d, a 
hundred miles south of Billy, heads straight into the teeth of the thing. Two 
hundred miles east, . . . the Liberian-registered Zarah, also heads for New 
York. Ray Leonard on the sloop Saitori has decided not to head for port; he 
holds to a southerly course for Bermuda. The Laurie Dawn 8 keeps plow- 
ing out to the fishing grounds and the Eis/~ilz Mar21 78, 150 miles due 
south of Sable Island, malces for Halifax harbor ro the northeast. Billy can 
either waste several days trying to get out of the way, or he can stay on- 
course For home. The fact that he has a hold full of fish, and not enough 
ice, must figure into his decision. 34 
Billy Tyne's decision proved wrong, and the Andrea Gail lost all six hands aboard?5 
Etaniclost over 1,500 souls, with only 705 saved?6 Both events were tragic. But only 
'' THE NIGHT LIVE5 ON, rrpm note 2, at GI. 
3 2 ~  p.c~al < -  thanla to Boyd Henderson for reminding me, a t  a luncheon, that some human ermr con- 
rributed to the hte  of the A n d m  Gail. 
33 J ~ N G E ~ ,  rzprpm narc 3, at 124 (quoting CaprainTommic Bartic, of the ship ANiron). 
j4 Id. 
35 Id. at 186. 
3 % N ~ ~ t ~  TO REMEMBER, rrrprn note 12, at 176. 
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the Titanic can trace the loss of life directly to human arrogance.37 When I compare 
the two tragedies in light of Jeffrey Slcilling's claim that the fall of Enron was based on 
factors outside of the company's control-an economic "perfect storm"-I find that 
Slcilling's claim Mls flat. 
11. HOW A FAILURE OF CHARACTER CAN TURN "PERFECT STORMS" 
INTO TITANIC MISTAKES 
I'm not going to rehash the mechanics of the various Eoron deals here. Others have 
done a good job of describing the problems with the deals?' with the Board's lack of 
oversight of the deals," and with the general culture of Enron that encouraged aggres- 
sive rislc-talcing and short-term profits?0 We obviously don'r know enough about the 
deals or the people yet to reach any final conclusions, so my comments are going to 
concentrate on one theme-character. If we are to believe that there is a single root 
cause of the Enroo mess (an arguable point at best in such a complicated situation), 
failure of character gets my nomination. 
)'The Golden Age's love of, and faith in, science contributed to the tngedy as well, as some of the 
miscalculations that Captain Smith made were based on the scientific advances in ship design. 
"See, rg., WILLLAM C. POWERS,]R., ET AL., REPORT OF hiVETIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTI- 
GATIm COMMITTEE OFTHE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENMN COllP., 2002 WL 19801 8 (CORPSCAN 
198081 8 (ENRON)) [hereinafter Powen Report]. The  Powers Report is also available at http://i.cnn.ncr/ 
cnn/2002/LAW/02/02/enron.rep0rdp0~ers~~ep01t.pdF. There is also a lot O F  good Congressional testi- 
mony on the subject. See, ~ g . ,  Federal Document Clearing House, Stren@b~rrir~gilccnr~~ztir~g Ouer~ight: 
Hearing Befor the Srtbronrnn. on Commerce, Trnde rind Corrn,rner P t t i  ofthe Harm Comm. on Energy 
a n d  Conmmerce, June 26,2002, nvnilnbleat 2002 WL 1381 127 (statemenr of Bala G. Dharan, J. Howard 
Creelmore Professor of Management, Rice University); Fcdenl Document Clearing House, U S ,  Serlntc 
~ - u ~~ ~ . . 
Fedenl Document Clearing House, Dercpd.nting Capi tnl i l . Iarkm O~rt l ine a t l ~ e  Teitinzotry of Profisor 
John C Coffee, f ~ ,  be@re the Srcb~o~tznliftee ON T C e c o t ~ ~ t t ~ t ~ ~ t i ~ ~ t i o n ~  and Firra re of the Hnlue Conzmrrre 
Committee, Nov. 14,2002, a u n i l n b l e n t 2 0 0 2 W L  1381127 (statement ofJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Columbia 
University). 
" See SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMlTlEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOV- 
ERNMENTAL &FAIRS, 107TH CONG., THE ROLE OF THE BOAN) OF DIECTORS IN ENRON'S COL- 
U\PSE, July 8,2002, nuni/nblenthttp://~vw.~ccess.gpo.go~/~ong~ess/senate/s~natl07.hunl [hereinalier 
Senate Print]. 
See, e .g ,  Tam Fowler, The Pride a n d  the Fa l l  of Eriron, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 20. 2002, ar A25 
[hereinafter ThePridtntrdtheFnll] ("[One manager, told that a deal would talce a year, said,] 'I haven't got 
I ymr. I f  I can't do i r  in thrcc rnonrhr I uon'r do i r  br.c:iusr. my bonus dcpcods on it"' since "Ironu~r\l wcrc 
baed  on rllr iuml v:tluc of the d~.nl. nor rhc cull it brouahr in."l: GKC H ~ I L I I .  TI,? E , I I ~ ~ E ~ I ~ O I I I T / , C  
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Character and leadership are inextricably linked.'" When the leaders are engaging 
in self-dealing and side deals,"hd the supervisors of those leaders are also engaging in 
side deals,13 and the gatekeepers are approving those side deals,"" what should the rank. 
and fde be thinking! Given the magnitude of the potentially illegal profits made by 
CFO Andrew Fastow and CEO Jeffrey ~ l i l l i n ~ , "  and the sense of entitlement that 
Enton encou~a~ed , "~  it must have talcen significant strength of character to resist get- 
ting on that gravy train. And yet, several people did resist. Who resisted, and why? 
By now, those following the Enton case lcnow that Sherron Watkins tried to alert 
CEO Kenneth Lay to serious concerns chat she had about Enroni deals: 
Shordy aFter Enron announced Slcilling's unexpected resignation on August 
14, 2001, Watlins sent a one-page anonymous letter to Lay. The letter 
stated that "Enron has been very aggressive in its accounting-most nota- 
bly the Raptor transactions." The letter raised serious questions concerning 
the accounting treatment and economic substance of the Raptor ttansac- 
tions (and transactions between Enton and Condor Trust, a subsidiary of 
Whitewing Associates), identifying several of the matters discussed in this 
Reporr. It concluded that "I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in 
" Mary C. Daly, Pnnel Di~omioti on Enrorr: What 1%/~nt I\htrg?, 8 FOmHAM J. CON'. & FIN. L. 1. 
S28 (2002) ("Whar the literature reaches is that h e  ethical behavior ir taught from d ~ e  top down.. . . It 
is management's commitment to ethical standards that sets the tone."). 
"The sclf-dealing by former Enron CFO Andrew Fastow was, apparently, approved by Enron's Board 
ofDirectors when the Board waived its ethics rules (more han  once) to allow Fastow to h a d  nvo oarmcr- 
ships rhntwould be negoriaringwith Enron. Sre. e .5 .  Letter from Max Hendrick, 111, V~nson & Elldnr, to 
J a m s  V Derrick. Jr., Enron [Re: Preliminary Investigation of Allegations of an Anonymous Employccl 
(Oct. 15,2001), nunilnble nt 2001 WL 1764266 (CORPSCAN); rep a h  Senate Print, szpra note 39, at 
23-24; Powers Report, rrpm note 38, at '68-71. 
"The Enron B o d  apparently had several dirccrars who also had consulting agtecmcnc; with Enron, 
enabling a form of double-dipping. Ser Senate Print, rrrpm note 39, at 51-55. 
" See Powers Report, npm note 38, at '10 ("There was an absence orforcehl and effective oversight 
by Senior Enmn Management and in-house counsel, and objcctivc and critical professional advice by 
outside caunscl at Vinson & Elldns, or auditors at Andersen."). 
45  Fmtotu Chnrged \nth Fmrtd, Cmrqiracy in Enrorr Cme, WASH. PO=, Oct. 3. 2002, at AOI: April 
Wirr 8r Peter Bchr, Drcnmjob Etno Inn, nNighhrmre; SkiNingiS~rcreir Cl~rrerrtHi~h Price, WAZH. POST, 
July 29,2002, at A01; ree aho Senate Prinr, rrpm note 39, at 24,34-36; Powers kpor t ,  rrLppm note 38, at 
'3, 10. 
""nron employees who mastered dlc art oftrading and dcal-maldng could earn fantastic sums. 
Annual bonuses wcrc as high as $1 million. Sharrly after each bonus rime, a ncw cmp ofsilvcr 
Porsches-the moer favored sntus symbol at Enron-would appear in h e  company garage. "I 
remember one trader going crazy because his bonus was only $500,000. He was cursing and 
screaming and rhmwing things at his deslc." one former Enron employee tedls. "He thought 
because he was so brilliant, rhcy should be paying him a lot marc." 
Hassell, nq,m note 40, at 1. 
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a wave of accounting scandals." Lay told us that he viewed the letter as 
thoughtfully written and alarming."' 
Wadcins later told Lay that she had written the letter and met with him regarding 
her concerns!' Lay referred the matter to Enron's General Counsel, James Derrick, a 
former Vinson & EUcins partner!9 Derrick in turn aslied Vinson & Ellcins, one of 
Enron's key outside law firms, to conduct a preliminary review of the situation-but 
nor to review the underlying transactions that Wadcins had discussed in her letter.50 
Within the confines of Derriclc's request, Vinson & Ellcins conducted an investigation 
(interviewing Watlcins, among others). 
V&E concluded that "none of the individuals interviewed could identify any trans- 
action between Enron and LJM that was not reasonable from Enron's standpoint or 
that was contrary to Enron's best interests." O n  the accounting issues, V&E said that 
both Enron and Andersen aclmowledge[d] "that the accounting treatment on the Con- 
dorlWhitewing and Rapror transactions is creative and aggressive, but no one has 
" Powcrs Report, rrtppm note 38, at 79. Note the new standards of behavior imposed on company 
attorneys by Sarbanes-Oxley: 
Not later thnn 180 days after the dare of cnacrmcnr of this Act, the Commission shall issue 
rules, in the public interest and far the prorccrion of investors, setting fordl minimum standards of 
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and pncticing before the Commission in any way in 
the represenration of issuers, including a rulc- 
(1) requiringm attorney to repon cvidencc ofa material violation ofsecurities law or breach of 
fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counscl 
or the chief executive officer of the complny (or thc equivalent thereof); and 
(2) if the counsel or ogcrr does nor appropriately respond to the evidence (adopting, as neces- 
sary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attor- 
ney to report the cvidencc to the audit commincc of the board of directors of die issuer or to 
another committee of the board ofdirectors comprised solely ofdirectors not employed direcdy or 
indirectly by the issuer, or to the b o d  ofdirectors. 
Sarb:mes-Oxley Act of2002 § 307, 15 USC 9 7245 (West Supp. 2002). AFrcr a whole slew ofparties 
filed objccrions to the SECS Proposed Rule regarding atrorncy conduct (with many of the objcctionr 
focused on the "noisy withdrawal" provisions of the l'roposcd Rule, rce http://~vww.scc.go~/ruIeslpro- 
posed/r74502.~html), the SEC nppnrrntly abandoned the "noisy withdrawfl provision in its final 
rer l~ttp://~v.sec.gav/ncws/pms/2003-13.htm. As of d ~ i s  writing, I have only seen the press relcasc 
regarding h e  final rule, not the actual text of the rule.- 
The daysaftaldngan irrue only partially up the chain ofcommand arcover, at least for publicly traded 
compnnies. But havcn'r lawyers always had the responsibility oFtaking manta  all the way up the chain of 
command? See MODEL RULE OF PROF'I. CONDUCT R 1.13 (2002). I wondcr whcrher Ms. Watldns, as 
an accountant, had a similar dury under her professioni ethics rules. lrshr did have such a duty, and she 
didn't go all thcway to the Board ofDirrctars (and beyond) with hrrconcerns, \rosshe r d l y  awhisdeblowcr? 
(Mind you, whar she did took some guts, even though she was not a whistleblower in d ~ e  true sense.) 
Powers Report, rtrpra note 38, at 79. 
'' See Ellcn Joan Pollock, A n d m n :  Called to Account: Elrrorr Lawyers Farr Cor~greis Ouer Their Role, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 15,2002, at C13 (noting that Dcrriclr used to be a partner at Vinson Br Elkins). 
'"ewers Report, rrrpm note 38, at 79. 
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reason to believe that it is inappropriate From a technical standpoint." V&E concluded 
that the facts revealed in its preliminary investigation did not warrant a "further wide- 
spread investigation by independent counsel or auditors," although the firm did note 
that the "bad cosmetics" of the Rapror related-party transactions, coupled with d ~ e  
poor performance of the assets placed in the Raptor vehicles, created 'k serious risk of 
adverse publicity and 1itigation."j1 
One observation: Vinson & Ellcins's undertalcing of the investigation had certain 
restrictions, including Enron's request not to review the bona fides of the underlying 
transa~tions.~'We don't know what sort of give and ralce occurred between Enron and 
Vinson & Ellcins about the useMness of such a request.j3 At some point, thanlcs to the 
abiliry of Enron's chapter 11 management to waive the attorney-client privi~ege,~' we 
5 l  Id. at *80. 
"Id .  at '71). "The result of rheV&E review was largcly predcrermincd by the scopc and nature of the 
investigation and the process employed. . . .The scopc and process of the investigation appear to have 
bccn strucrurcd with less skepricism than was needed to see through these particularly cornplcx tmsac- 
tions." Id. at '81 (footnote omitted). 
53]ordan Mina, Enran Global Finance's General Counsel, has stated that Vinson & Ellcins "fulfilled 
its professional duries" in terms of the advice it gave to Enron. Laura Goldberg, Er~ror~j. Imrd nr Releuant 
nrDczrlrIReporrril.lnyH~u~ E l d P ~ r t i n l  Tnith~, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 11,2002, at 1. Because ofVinson & 
Elldnri ties to Enron's Gcncral Counsel Jnmm Derrick, though, Mina  hired a separate firm, Fried, F m k ,  
Harris, Shriver &Jacobson, to review the deals ofwhich Wadcins had camplaincd. RoncTempest, E?~rorr 
Cotrtlrrl WcnzedALorrt P~rmcr~hiyr Robc Conpnrij~i L e p l E u e c ~ r t i e d  Opinion ofLaw Fin12 61 April. 
Co~~b~e~~ionnlIr~veiti~i~to~~ Sny It 1Vm to 'Hnlt Thir Pmctict,' L.A. TIM=, Jan. 31,2002, at CI .  I'm nor yet 
rndy to gct on thc bandwagon that denounces all of Enroris lawyers. 
The principal m e  involving privilege in dxe banluuprcy context is, of course, Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission v. Wcinmuh, 471 U.S. 343, 358 (1985) ( " M e  hold that the trustee ofa corpora- 
tion in [a chapter 71 banlvuptcy has the power to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege with 
respcct to pre-bmkruprcy cammunications."). Wcintnub answcrcd the question of how much control a 
chapter 7 trustee had aver the corporation's attorney-client privilege. Id. SSubsequent cases have annvered 
the question about how hr  rhc Weintraub holding could go in a chapter 11 contort. See, e.$, Am. 
Mcuacornm Corp. v. Duane Morris & Heclscher LLP, 274 B.R 641, 6 5 P 5 6  (Banlrr. D. Dcla. 2002) 
(snting that debtor-in-possession controls attorney-client privilege, and debtor-in-possession can request 
documents from attorneys even if attorneys raise work product privilege as a defense): In re Bame, 251 
B.R 367,370,374 (Bnnlir. D. Minn. 2000) (converting chaprcr 1 l case to chapter 7 case; holding thar 
chapter 7 trustee can access the port-petition, prc-canvcaion . communications bctwcrn the debtor-in- 
possession nnd its lawyers becauc the privilege is held by the estate, and not by the debtor-in-porse55ian): 
Whythyre v. Williams (In re Williams), 152 B.R. 123, 129 (Bankr. N.D. Tew. 1992) ("The liquidating 
trustee [undcr a confirmed chaprer I I plan] controls the power to waive or invoke the evidenriav privi- 
leges thar arise in connection with the causes afacrion transfcrtcd to the liquidating trust under h i c l e  
25.5 of the confirmed plan."); rre~lro  S. AirTtansp.. Inc. v. SAT Group. Inc.. 255 B.R. 706,711 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 2000) (cirations omirtrd). 
Thc Court agrees that a corporate fiduciary ir precluded from asserting privileges to protect his 
own intercrts that are advenc to those of the corporation. Corporate officers must "exercise the 
privilege in a manner consisrcnr with their tiduciary capacity to act in the best interests of the 
corporation and not of themselves individually." 
Id. The interesting part ahour the privilege issue in the Enron banluuprcy context is whether Steve 
Cooper (the restructuring expert currently running Enron) is going to waive the privilege in order to get 
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may learn more. But I have to admit, right off the bat, that I have a hard time believing 
that Vinson & EUcins, or any of Enron's other law firms, lrnowingly advised Enron to 
do anything that was clearly illegal. The real issue is how Enron handled the grey areas 
of the law, based on the advice of all of its lawyers (both its in-house and outside 
counsel). 
Watkins wasn't the lone voice questioning Enron's deals; others, including Enron 
Global Finance's General Counsel Jordan Mina,  were concerned about the structure 
and disclosure of the various deals.55 Apparently, Fastow and Slcilling didn't brook 
disagreement willingly. Those who objected often found themselves the subject of 
pressure, downright abuse, and exile.5G 
I'd like to put forward one strilcing similarity between the Titanic and Enron: a 
failure of meaningful communication stemming from a belief that someone else had 
'talcen care of it." Here's how a recent newspaper article described the problem: 
[Slince most only saw their part of the business, they assumed the problems 
were isolated. . . . "You understood your piece of the business and maybe 
what the guy next to you did, hut very few understood the big picture. . . . 
information from the wious  law firms that rcprescnted Enron and then, if the information gives risc to 
a cause of action against any oFEnronls lawyers, use that very information to pursue them in bankruptcy 
court. Mr. Cooper can dso pursue Enron's officers and directors using that privileged informarion, as the 
privilege belongs to the client (Enmn) and not to any of the clienr's employees. I've been following the 
work of the Severed Enron Employees Coalition in the pursuit of rhc prcpetition bonuses paid to certain 
Enron executives on the theory that d ~ e  bonuses were fraudulent convcyances. Severed Enron Employees 
Coalition v. N. Trust CO., NO. 02-0267 (S.D. Tex. complaint, tiled Jan. 24,2002). Any privileged advice, 
on the order of "Should we pny this person a rctcntion bonus? What will we get in terms of a benefit far 
the retention bonus?," could be I~elpCul in this regard. 
l5 See, e.g., Senate Prinr, rrtprn note 39, at 28 n.81 (quoting an internd mcmorandum from Mina): 
[Tlhe Company needs to improve both the process it follows in executing such tnnsactions 
and implement impmved pmcedures regarding written substanriatian supporung and memorializ- 
ing the EnronILJM transactions. . . . [Flirsr is the need for the Company to implcmcnr a more 
active and systematic effort in pursuing "on-LJM sales alternatives before approaching LJM . . . ; 
the second is to . .  . impose a more rigorous testing of the hirness and benefits realized by Enron in 
transacring with LJM. 
Id.; ,re elm Dan Feldstein, Skilli~rg Srys He Did No IWor~g 1 Lnryer Told Not to Stick Ned Otct, Hous. 
CHRON., Feh. 8, 2002, at 1 (describing how Fasrow tried to bully Mina into blmsing irregularities in 
certain Enron dcds). 
"See, e.8, The Pride nndrht Fall, rtrprn note 40, at 27A (listing three people--hdcrsen partner Carl 
Bass, former Enron CFO (after Fastow) Jeff McMahon, and former Merrill Lynch analyst John Olson- 
who were dcmotcd (Olson was fired) aker criticizing the aggressive Enron deals and accounting meth- 
ods); reenlro Editorial Desk. Not Qtlite n iW,i~tIe-Bloruer; N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15.2002, arA20; Andy Geller, 
'YB~Iieve12.f~. Skilli~~gnndiZ.lr. Fostolu Dr1ped12.fr. Lny'LEnrorr W R i p  Drro Be,& Corzgess, N.Y. POST, 
Feb. 15. 2002, at 9;  Susan Schmidt. CEO IVa >fi~seruedlAt Errron, Hill Told Fanner. Ex~crrtive Bb~,zes 
Other %pManngcrr,WASH. POST, Feb. 15,2002, ar AOl; Peter Spiegel, TheArchitebofE~~ro~fiDoro~rfnll: 
Intenml Probe Revmlr Andy Fmru  N a CFO t u h ~  Bttllied Staff and EUEJ~ Wnll Sweet Banks, Errrichirrg 
Hinuelfby More than Dollnrr 45nr br thf Process, FIN. T I M E S ,  May 21, 2002, at ,420. 
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That segmentation allowed us to get worlc done very quiddy, but it isolated 
that institutional knowledge into the hands ofvery few people."57 
Certainly, the Powers Report describes the failure of follow-through regarding sev- 
eral of the Enron deals-the failure to ascertain if the checla and balances, supposedly 
part of each deal's structure, were in place and worlting."As John CofFee explains, 
Enron . . . hrnish[es] ample evidence of a systematic governance failure. 
Although other spectacular securities frauds have been discovered from 
time to time over recent decades, they have not generally disturbed the 
overall market. In contrast, Enron has clearly roiled the marlcet and created 
a new investor demand for transparency. Behind this disruption lies the 
market's discovery that it cannot rely upon the professional gatekeepers- 
auditors, analysts, and others-whom the marker has long trusted to filter, 
verify and assess complicated financial information. Properly understood, 
Enron is a demonstration of gatelceeper Failure, and the question it most 
sharply poses is how this failure should be rectified." 
Failures of gatekeeper professionals aren't new. The savings and loan crisis, which 
also represented a significant gatekeeper failure, occurred a mere twenty years ago:"' 
the Salomon Brothers Treasury bonds trading scandal occurred just ten years ago."' 
j7 See, cs, The Pridt mid the FnN, rrpm note 40, at 27.4. Rcmcmbcr that those "very few people" 
included members ofthe Board of Directors, which waived Enron's ethics rules mare than once to allow 
self-dealing by some of Enroni cxccutivct. Secrrpm note 42. 
jU See Powers Report, rrpnr norc 38, at '18-28. 
jS John C. Coffee, Jr. Uzdrr~tnnding Enron: Iti Abotrt the Gntekeepe~.r, Stupid, 57 Bus. LAW. 1403 
(2002) (footnote omitted), reprinted br thii book at 125-143. 
"Now that I wear bifocals, twenty years just doesn't seem that long ago. 
" Daly, srtpm note 41, at S25428: Fedeml Document Clearing House, US. Senate Cornminer on 
Conznzerce, Srie~rre nud Tmr~spomtion Holds a Henring on Enrorr Bnnknptr): Dec. 18, 2001, nuailable nt 
2001 WL 1623334 (statement ofJohn Coffee. Columbia University) ("Well, when a dchacle like Entnn 
occurs, thecritical question for Congress m d  for regulators is to ask, ar; you've been beginning to a k ,  where 
were the gatekeepers: where were the watchdogs?. . . Here, all hiled, and all hiled hirly abysmally."). 
The Mlout from [rhr saving.; and loan] scandal included a Justicc Department action against 
thc piesrigious New Yorli firm of Kaye, Schalcr, Fierman, Hays & Handler. I(ayc, Scholcr and 
partner Peter Fishbein were raid to have gone beyond mere aggressive lnwycring, and more than 
one obscrvct vicwcd their teptesentation as aldn to aiding and abetting, while others attributed any 
crtots to simple inattenriveness. Ulrimatrly, the case w a  srrrled, with thc firm and its malpractice 
carrier pnying $41 million in settlement, and the I<eating lawyers paid for rhrir alleged sins, not- 
withstanding their ability to spread the loss to other lawyers via malpnctice insurance coverage. 
Jeffrey W. Srcmpcl, Et,rbracing D t r c ~ t :  The B~nknptry ofa Birrinerr Pflrndiplfor Concrptrializing and 
RegztLztirrg the Lepl  Prof.r~io,z. 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 111-12 (1991)) (footnatcs omitted). For a 
It's certainly possible that many of the legal and accounting professionals (the in- 
house and the outside professionals) who advised Enron assumed thar Enron's own 
businesspeople were doing the follow-through; moreover, many of those same profes- 
sionals may well have thought that it was not the lawyers' or accountants' "place" to 
bill Enron for continued checlts of the system. (I lrnow nothing about the training of 
accountants, so I'm going to limit the rest of this discussion to the training nflawyers.) 
If the lawyers saw themselves as morally independent from Enron, rather than morally 
interdependent, then they might well have believed that it was Enron's job, not theirs, 
to ensure follow-through. A more complex explanation is thar cognitive dissonance- 
well-documented in social science literature and applied to lawyers by, among others, 
David Luban-prevented the lawyers from seeing some of these deals more clearly. My 
hunch is that both concepts (a mistalcen belief in moral independence, rather than 
interdependence, and the effects of cognitive dissonance) played a part in any failures 
by the gatelceepers. 
A. "Moral Independence" Versus "Moral Interdependence" as an 
Explanation 
For the longest time, lawyers have done everything they could to distinguish the 
client's ends from the means that the lawyers used to achieve those ends. This "moral 
independence" theory has been used to justify eve+ng from lawyers who talce on 
unpopular causes to lawyers who facilitate shady deals, even though the original theory 
was never intended to justify shady deals!" 
wonderful discussion of the IGye, Scholer firm and the savings and loan crisis, see David B. Wilkins, 
M,~kingContnr Cormt: &gr/atir~gLazyerrAfterhy~, Srholer, 66 S. CAL. L. FGV. 1147 (1993).As Clarence 
Darrow apparendy said, "History repeats itself, and rhais one of the things thar's wrong with history." 
The Quotations Home Page, available nt hnp:llwww.geociues.cam/-spanoudi/ropic-l~3.html#history. 
I' According to a study by Envin Smigel, lawyers' 
independence derived fmm nuo sources. First, "they. . . 'represeni the law and must therefore 
separate rhemselves from the clienr." Second, the commodiry they sold was "[ilndependent legnl 
opinion." Smigel observedthat "clienr[s] desire thar afirm maintain itsautonomy" so that rhey can 
obtain the best advice. Moreover, a the Ixge firms grew older, they increased their number of 
clients and moved away fmm fundamentally relying on one or a few clienc~. This rhik "strength- 
ened . . . a firm's abiliry to retain its independence" because "no one client provid[es] enough 
income to materially or cansciously influence d ~ e  law office's legal opinion." 
Russell G. Pearce, Lnruyrrr m Anrericai Govtmirzg Clnrr: The Fornmtion and Dimlrrtion of  the Ort@rmI 
Uxdcr~tandi~zg of the Anrertcan Latoyeri Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCt1. ROUNDTABLE 381. 406 (2001) (foot- 
not- omitted) [hcreindrer Governing Class] (quoting ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL S T U U  LAWYER: 
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? (1964)). 
The fun part about the history of the bat's independence theory is its link with the robber barons of 
yesteryear. See, e.5, Thomas L. Shaffer, ThcRof~riori mahJoralZacher, 18 ST. MARY'S L.]. 195,222-23 
(1986) [hereinafter Moral Teacher]; Thomas L. Shaffer, The Lhiqrie, Noucl, rind U ~ ~ o r ~ ~ ~ d A d u e r ~ ~ ~ E r b i c ,  
41 VAND. L. REV. 697,703-04 (1988). As Russell Pearce points our, 
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Several scholars have recognized, though, that the complexity of modern legal prac- 
tice forces lawyers to tale a more active role in shaping not just the clients' advice but 
the clients' deals and litigation as well.@ Richard Painteis "moral interdependence" 
theory of the lawyer-client interaction is a more realistic view of the lawyer's modern 
role, especially when it comes to complex transactions or complex litigation.64 
When you overlay the lawyer's moral interdependence on top of a cutthroat culture, 
you get Enron (and WorldCom, and Tyco, etc.). We still don't know a lot of the facts 
behind Enron's various deals, including what the various lawyers said, Enron's response 
to that advice, or how much the accountants' advice contradicted (or suppotted) the 
lawyers' advice. Bur we do know that the structure of Enron itself encouraged a con- 
stant pushing of the outside of the envelope." Enron encouraged a "me, first" struc- 
ture, not a cooperative one. 
"Enron sought to redefine the rules of the industry," said Robett Bruner, a 
professor at the University ofVirginia who has made a case study ofEnron's 
culture. "It was a culture of challenge and confrontation." 
. . . . 
[Former CEO Jeffrey] Skilling also is responsible, many insiders say, for 
creating a mercenary, cutthroat culture to stoke the fires beneath the enter- 
prise. One of the hallmarks of the Skilling regime was a performance re- 
view process that employees called "rank and yank." The evaluations 
compared the performance of employees against one another, with the bot- 
tom 15 percent getting axed every year. 
In becoming hired guns, elite lawyers abandoned the traditional governing dass ideology. They 
were no longer acting as a disinterested political leadenhip capable ofdiscerning and pursuing d ~ e  
common good. Instead, they were advocates ofprivate interests. They hadvialatcd pmfessionalism's 
taboo on actingas a servant ofbig business and could no longer claim the special rie ro the public 
good which distinguishcd them from those in business. 
Pearce, Gowenrin~ C l m ,  sripra, ar 400-10. 
" Richard W. Painter, TheMornlInrerdepmdencc of Coporn teLn~uyer ra~~d  Their Clieritr, 67 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 507,5 11,544-45 (1994); reenho id. at 526 ("Joint decisionmaking by lawyer and clicnr has become 
both efficient and prudent.") (footnore omitted). 
'' For example, the Powers Reporr points out that, wid, respect to preparing the various dirclorure 
forms that Enran filed, "[wlhile accountants toolc the lead in preparing the financial statement footnote 
~ ~ . .  - 
disclosures, lawyers played a more ccnual role in preparing the pmxy statements, including the disclosures 
of the related-parry transactions." Powers Report, rriprn note 38, at 84. This interdependence is by no 
means 1imirL.d to rhc lauycrr who workutl an  Enron'r dcala. Scr Go, rnti,,~: Cllur, ~,,,ur.i nore 6 2 ,  at 408-09 
lcirina Rubrrr A. Kawn 2nd Rubrr< Eli Rosrn. On the SurialS~~miiicn,rrc ofLnxv I.z,t Firu,r h~nrr i r r .  37 
. , - ,  , . ~ 
STAN. L. REV. 399 (1985) and Robert L. Nelson, Ideolog, Practice, nrrd P m $ ~ ~ i o l r n ~ A f l t l ) n o ~ ~ y :  Social 
I/olrresn~rd ClientRrl?rio,rrl,iprtiip i n  rhcLnrgeLnruFinn, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1985)). Borh the IGgnn Br 
Roren study and the Nelson study are well worth reading. 
"I first saw this phrase in TOM WOLFE, THE NGHT STUFF 12 (1979). 
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The evaluations were done by asldng employees to judge others' perfor- 
mance. They did so lrnowing their own promotions and survival hung in 
the balance. 
"Because of that, you never helped one another," said one former Enron 
employee. "Everyone was in it for themselves. People stabbed you in the 
back." 
Teamwork, once a source of strength, started to disappear. 
"It was every man for himself," a former E ~ o n  executive said. 
What sense of teamworlc survived "rank and yank" was undermined by 
Enron's reward system, which seemed to place no value on group goals but 
lavishly rewarded individual accomplishment. An employee who could dose 
big deals got big bonuses and promotions. Those who couldn't were shown 
the door.66 
Let's take this moral interdependence theory one step further. Add to the theory (1) 
Enron's culture, and (2) the personality traits of a large number of lawyers (whether or 
not they ever had Enron as a client), and you have a disaster just waiting to happen. 
Susan Daicoff has summarized the literature on lawyers' personaliy traits quite nicely 
in a series of articles.67 Lawyers tend to have certain personaliy characteristiu; that 
contribute to their need to "win." They "appear to be more competitive, aggressive, 
and achievement-oriented, and overwhelmingly Thidcers (instead of Feelers). . . . Law- 
yers are more often motivated by a need for achievement than are others, which in- 
cludes a need to compete against an internal or external standard of intelligence."68 No 
matter which way you slice it, these gatekeepers were too closely involved with their 
client6' to be able to stand up and say, "You shouldn't do that." At some point, we need 
lawyers to say, "The law lets you do it, but don't. . . . It's a rotten thing to do."7U 
" Hascll, rrlpm note 40. For a masterful compendium ofthe theories surrounding communiry norms 
in monitoring and shaping the roles of lawyers, see W Bradley Wendel, NnnlcplRe~tlntioa of the L e p l  
Pmjssio,r SocialNonnr 6 ,  Proj~rionnl Commaaitics, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955 (2001) [hrreinafrer Social 
Nornri]. 
"See, c s ,  Susan Daicoff, L n l y e ~  Krtoru ThyszPA Reuieru ofE~~rpirirnlRe~cnrc!, 071 AttorneyAmibrrter 
Benrinx on P r o j ~ ~ i o ~ m l i ~ ~ n ,  46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337 (1997) [hereinafter Know Thyre@; Susan Daicoff, 
(O~ynror.on?)EthicalDeci~io~~~~~nki~~gbyAho~~~qi:A~~ EnpiricalShtdy, 48 FLA L. REV. 197,217-18 (1996). 
6%~zntow Thyseg sup" note 67, at 1408-09 (footnotes omitted). According to Daicoff, law rcudenct 
come into law school hard-wired with these mi=. Id. at 1349-50. Imagine my reliefar luawing that law 
school didn't "ruin" them. 
" Sec, r . ~ ,  rrpm notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
7" So1 M. Linowie, 1CInserrt ofTnltl,for the Lr~lProf . s~iors  Address ar the University of Wisconsin 
LawSchool (Ocr. 24,1997). in 1997Wls. L. REV. 1211,1214-15 ("I believeElihu Root onceagain had 
it exactly right when he cold a client: "The law ler[s] you do it, bur don't. . . . It's a rotten thing to do."). 
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B. Cognitive Dissonance as an Explanation 
Even if the gatelceepers weren't so closely involved with the client, there's yet another 
reason for their failure to protest the deals thar were on (or over) the edge: cognitive 
dissonance. My sociologist friends7' tell me that moral development alone-which is 
an individual trait-can't explain how an individual will react to a particular situa- 
ti~n!~The situation itselfwill interact with the traits ofthe individual, and both the 
person's individual traits and his situation will affect an 0utcome.7~ 
Peer pressure is one such particular influence. There are some well-regarded studies 
showing that even relatively obvious physical conclusions, such as the distance from 
one point to another or the length of a line, can become subject to "groupthink," 
placing peer pressure on the unbelieving minoriv to conform to the wrong-headed 
rhinlcing of the majority.74 And if hard-wired concepts, such as size and location, are 
manipulable by the particulars of the situation, what about the fuzzier concept of 
behavior? 
Stanley Milgram's studies on the willingness of experimental subjects to inflict pain 
(electrical shoclts) on complete strangers can give us a glimpse into how powerful the 
effect of a particular situation can be. In Milgram's best-lcnown study, the actual suh- 
ject was asked to give a series of progressively more severe shoclts to someone who was 
posing as a fellow experimental subject. Although the actual subject usually agonized 
about administering the shoclu, he went ahead and administered them nonethele~s.7~ 
In analyzing Milgram's experiment, Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett concluded that 
the powerful structure ofthe situation-the authority figure setup; the calm tones of 
" Special thanlu go to Julia McQuillan, who guided mc through the litenrurr and theories in her 
ficld. 
'' CJ Julia IvlcQuillan &Julie Pfeiffer, IVhy Annchlnkei ra Dizzy: RendiqAnue ofGmcn Gnblerfronz 
n Gender Periyectiue, 16 MOSAIC 3412, June 2001, at 19 ("In an attempt to crplain variation within scr 
carcgaries, sociologisu have ;argued that external social structures (our actual experiences in the world) 
organize our behnvior more than socialization (how we've bcen told to behave)."). 
73 Thc thought that moral dcv~lopmcnt alonc can predict a pcaon's bchavior without regard to the 
particular siruadon is called the "fundamental attribution error." See DAVID J. LuBAN, THE ETHICS OF 
WRONGFUL OBEDIENCE, irr ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLB, ~ P O N S I B I L I T I B ,  AND REGULA- 
TION 94, 101 (Debonh L. Rhode cd., 2000) [hereinokcr WRONGFUL OBEDIENCE]; ree n60 Lee M .  
Johnron, et al., Gerreral Wrnu Specific WVict Blanzir~fi 142 J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 249 (Apr. 2002) ("The 
fundamenral attribution error occurs when individuals overemphasize personal artribures and discount 
environmental attributes in their judgmenti ofothers"); LEE ROSS,THE INTUITIVE PSYCHOLOGIST AND 
HIS SHORTCOMINGS: DISTORTIONS IN THE AWNBUTION PROCESS, IN 10 ADVANCES IN EXPENMEN- 
TAL SOClAL PSYCI-I. 173 (Leonard Bcrl<owia rd., 1977); refgenem//y DAVID C. FUNDER, PERSONALITY 
JUDGMENR A RWLISL'IC APPROACH TO PERSONAL PERCEI'TION (1999). 
'' LEE ROSS 81 RICHAN) E. NISBE'IT, THE PERSON AND THE SrlUATIONS: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 30 (1991) ("Our most basic perceptions and judgmenti about thc world are socially condi- 
tioned and dicrarcd.") (citing ShcriFs "autoliinctic cffeci' studies and Aschs "comparison lines" studies). 
75 Id. at 56-57. 
the experimenter standing next to the subject who was administrating the shocks; the 
experimenter's repetition of the phrases, "The experiment requires that you continue; 
you have no choice"-sewed to overcome the subjects' expressed desire to stop the 
experiment before reaching the "severe shock" stage?6 ~ n s t  of the subjects were sty- 
mied by uncertainty and couldn't overcome the social pressure of the situation. It's not 
that the subjects were sadists. But the structure of the situation prevented them from 
acting on their own reluctance to continue the shocla. 
David Luban has also described the Milgram experiment and has pointed out that 
almost two-thirds of the subjects in Milgram's experiments actually did go all the way 
to 450 volts?7 He  posits that a "corruption of judgment" stemming from cognitive 
dissonance caused two-thirds of the subjects of Milgram's experiments to "lcill" the 
learner: 
[Tlhe lcey to understanding Milgram compliance lies in features of the 
experimental situation. . . .The teacher moves up the scale of shocla by 15- 
volt increments, and reaches the 450-volt level only at the thirtieth shock. 
Among other things, this means that the subjects never confront the ques- 
tion "Should I administer a 330-volt shoclc to the learner?" The question is 
"Should I administer a 330-volt shock to the learner given that I've just 
administered a 315-volt shock?" It seems clear that the latter question is 
much harder to answer. . . . 
Cognitive dissonance theory teaches that when our actions conflict with 
our self-concept, our beliefs and attitudes change until the conflict is re- 
moved. . . . Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that when I have given 
the learner a series of electrical shocla, I simply won't view giving the next 
shock as a wrongful act, because I won't admit to myself that the previous 
shocla were wrong.78 
Luban's most important point is that lawyers aren't immune to the effects of cogni- 
tive dissonance. He does a masterful job of linlcing the Berkey Pl~oto-Inc. v. Emn72 
Ihdak Co." case and Stanley Milgram's experiments on obedience to explain how very 
well-intentioned lawyers can find themselves slipping into serious breaches of ethics. 
For those who aren't familiar with this case, Brad Wendel describes it nicely: 
'"me ofMilgram's larer variations on the scudy involved changing rhc setting from Yale to an inner- 
city, run-down, suspicious-looking lab in another town. He recorded appraximarely the same results, no 
matter the sctring. See id. ar 55. 
WRONGFUL OBEDIENCE, srpm note 73, at 97 ("In reality, 63 percent of subjects complied all the 
way to 450 volts. Mareovct, this is a robust result: i r  holds in groups of women a well as men, and 
experimenters obtained comparable results in Holland, Spain. Iraly, Ausmlia, South Africa. Germany, 
and Jordan.. . .") (footnore omirted). 
"Id .  ar 102 (foornorct omitted). 
" 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
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The lawyers representing Ibdak had retained an economist as an expert 
witness, expecting that he would testify that Kodak's domination of the 
market was due to its superior technological innovations, not to 
anticompetitive behavior. The plaintiffs counsel requested any documents 
pertinent to the expert's testimony Kodak's lawyer's resisted, and ultimately 
a magistrate ordered production of numerous documents including interim 
reports prepared by the economist. At the economist's deposition, one of 
Kodak's lawyers stated that he had destroyed the interim reports, which 
were somewhat unfavorable to Kodalt's defense. The lawyer even filed an 
affidavit in a subsequent discovery dispute in the case, stating under oath 
that the documents had been destroyed. In fact, the lawyer bad not de- 
stroyed the documents, but had hidden them in his office and widheld 
them from production. The 81davit was perjurous. The fallout was a ca- 
lamity for the firm. Ibdalc fired it and hired one of its arch-rivals to defend 
the antitrust case. The firm paid its client over $600,000 to settle Kodalis 
claims related to its conduct of the litigation. It lost Kodalis business, which 
had accounted for approximately one-fourth of the firm's billings and had 
employed thirty lawyers full-time. The partner who had coordinated the 
firm's preparation of the economist's testimony was released from the firm 
and spent twenty-seven days in jail for contempt of court?' 
In his discussion of the Berkgr-Kodak case, Luban relates the following episode: 
Joseph Fortenberry, the associate worlcing for [Mahlon Perlcins, the partner 
representing Kodak], knew that Perlcins was perjuring himself and whis- 
pered a warning to him; but when Perkins ignored the warning, Fortenberry 
did nothing further to correct his misstatements. "What happened" recalls 
another associate, 'bas that he saw Perlcins lie and really couldn't believe it. 
And he just had no idea what to do. I mean, he . . . kept thinlung there 
must be a reason. Besides, what do you do? The guy was his boss and a 
great guy!"B1 
Fortenberty's comments highlight how fledgling lawyers will talce many social cues 
from those more experienced lawyers whom they respect?' Of course, the pressure 
"O Bradley Wlendrl, Momlig~ Moti~~ntion, and tht Proji~ionalLm Movenlmt, 52 S.C. L. REV. 557, 
6 0 6 0 7  (2001) (footnotes omitted); see a h  Walter Kiechell 111, The S m n ~ c  C,uc of Kodaki. Lawym~, 
FORTLINE. May 8, 1978, at 188. If1 were a supentitiaus son, I'd worry ahour the hct  that one of the two 
"smoking guns" in the case was Evhihit 6 6 6  Id. I I amtot maldng this up. 
'' WRONGFUL OBEDIENCE rrpm note 73, at 95 (footnotes omitted) 
Cognitive dissonance isn't limited to auwide counsel. In a study of inside caunsel, Hugh and Sally 
Gunz found that the lawycn' advice w a  nor always independent from the direction that the company 
itself intended to go: 
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that the senior lawyers have to lceep their clients, maintain their billings, and compete 
with other elire lawyers at other firms (who are all too happy to steal clients away), is 
relentless pressure indeed. But if the more senior lawyers can't withstand the pressure, 
then who will teach the fledgling lawyers to resist? 
111. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
Ifwe want lawyers to spend more time understanding themselves and their relation- 
ship to their clients, then we're going to have to lead from the top, with judges, part- 
ners, bar associations, and other senior lawyers all singing the same tune. It won't be 
sufticient for law professors to warn students against the temptations and pressures of 
law practice. As a matter of fact, it's depressing how little influence law professors have 
on their students' understanding of legal ethics. 
Larry Hellman's study on cognitive dissonance in a legal ethics class is proof of the 
need to have top lawyers do the preaching, not law professors.s3 Hellman aslced the 
students in his ethics course to lceep diaries of possible ethics violations that they ob- 
served while worlcing for lawyers during the semester, and those students recounted 
bad lawyering in an astonishing variety of forms-neglect, incompetence, conflicts of 
interest, and the liil~e.~"fwe want to train newly minted lawyers to be ethical, it's just 
not enough for law professors to talk the talk. We must join forces with the lawyers 
and judges in the "real world," those who can wallc the wallc. 
Lawyers need to behave as true counselors to their clients, rather than as hired guns 
who are just following orders. Society needs us to talce on the role of the social con- 
From a practitioner standpoint, the model highlights issues surrounding the naNre of the ad- 
vice that organizations can expect to ohnin from their in-house counsel when placed in positions 
of ethical conflict. In our original study of OPC [organiutianal profasiond conflict], we sug- 
p t e d  that an important implicadon ofour findings was that in-house counscl might not necesrar- 
ily always provide disinterested professional advice. In their different ways, the Technician and 
Organization Person might superficially helpful advice, which could, under certain cir- 
cumstances, bc dangerously misleading. The Technician, for example, may deliver clever but myo- 
pic solutions, and rhc Observer could well misjudge a situation and rcmain silent inappropriately. 
But the Advisor, by avoiding the "cop" aspect of d ~ c  Lawyer role (in the sense that there is no 
implication that he or she intends to repart the situation to the next level higher within the orga- 
nization, or to a regulator outside the orpniwuon), stays closcr ro thc L~wyerh advice. So the 
model, as revised, suggests an cvcn grcarrrvaricry ofpotential responses than in its initial L[awyer], 
T[echnician], and O[bserver] form, underlining yet more firmly the need to avoid maldng simplis- 
ric assumptions about the nature ofthe advice in-house counsel provide their employcr[sl. 
Hugh I? Gunz & Sally I? Gunr, Th~Lnwyer>Respome to OTnniu?tio~mlProj~~io~~al Conflict:An Enrpiricnl 
SntrlyoftheEthicnlDeririo~rMnkit~~of61-Horrre Coerriel, 39AM. BUS. L.J. 241,279-80 (2002) (footnotes 
omitted). 
") Lawrence IC Hellman, ThtEff<ctr ofLnru Oficc l%rk on theFornmtion ofLtzru Shrdmu'Prof.~~in,~nl 
klner: Ob~eruntion, Erplntmtior~, Opthziultion. 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1991). 
84 Id. at 601-05. 
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science (or, if that sounds too darn highfallutin', the role of the grease that helps soci- 
ety run). As David Luban has pointed out, 
If lawyers have special responsibilities to legal justice, that is not because 
they are divinely elected, or better and holier that [sic] the rest of us. It is 
because of how their role fits into an entire division of social labor. Lawyers 
represent private parties before public institutions, or advise private parties 
about the requirements of public norms, or reduce private transactions to a 
publicly-prescribed form, or ratify that transactions are in compliance with 
public norms. To say that they have special duties of fidelity to those norms 
is no more ecstatic and supernatural than saying that food-preparers have 
heightened duties to ensure their hands are clean. It is their social role, not 
the brush of angels' wings on their foreheads, that requires [food service 
workers] to wash their hands every time they go to the bathr0om.8~ 
We used to be better at setting good examples, or so I've heard. In the "golden days" 
that Tom Shaffer recounts, some of the lawyers that he observed set wonderful ex- 
amples for their newly minted lawyer colleagues. In my favorite article of his, T h e  
Pro$ssion N a Moral Tenchei; he tells story after story of lawyers who did the right 
thing." The constant choice of ethical over unethical behavior helped mold the lawyer 
that Shaffer eventually became: 
[Those two partners in my former law firm] were philosophically and tem- 
peramentally different and . . . practiced law in different ways. That they 
were so much &ice in these moral matters said something about their per- 
sonal character, of course, but, in view of their personal differences, it also 
said something about the way the firm practiced law-about the way the 
firm functioned as the profession (for me) and, as the profession, Func- 
tioned (for me) as a moral teacher. It was not, that is, an apprenticeship, in 
which I was learning my craft, and the morals of my craft, from a master- 
or at least it didn't seem, then, that it was. It was the profession (the law 
firm) that was the moral teacher. . . . It was even more like the moral forma- 
tion a person gets from family, town, and church. Which is to say that, 
here, code depended on chara~ter.~' 
" David Luban, Arkirrgthe Right Qt~r~tiorlr, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 839, 849-50 (1999). 
86Moral Encber, rrqm note 62, at 214-17. 
" Id. ar 21617. 
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From his experience as a young lawyer, Shaffer took the moral lesson that a lawyer 
should also be a genJeman.BBTom Shafferi view of the "gentlemanly" lawyer, ofcourse, 
has its including Shafier himself.g0 And yet, we do understand the concept 
that he's trying to express:" that of a lawyer who understands her role in sociev as 
more than just a mete scrivener or functionary, and who tries always to take the moral 
high ground.g' 
"Thomas L. Shaffer, On Being n Pra$ssionnl Elder, 6 2  NOTW DAME L. REV. 624,630-31 (1987) 
[hereinafter Pmf~sior~nlElder] ("When chamcrer is in   lace, fortified by 'a few rules' that have ro do wid1 
orofcssional craft. the orefessional Denon becomo dependable. Professional characrer ir the connection 
. . 
bcrwccn virtue and craft. The convention has bccn ra describe that connection with the word gentle- 
man.") (footnorcs omirred). Ifyou haven't m d  Tom Shaffer's work on this topic, you should. For a quick 
shc,rrcl~t-n<,r tu bc c o n i s c d  wirh re~diog ShoITcr'a worl;-Leslie Gerher h>r ir~.nrcd a good primer. See 
Leslie t. Gerb;r, G ' h  [.,,rgrn & S,ft,td? 'l'l~e Tl,ro/oz~i.~/ Lrs.rl Er/,r/,rrr nfT/,om.u .S/~.~ff~r,  10 J.I.. & KLLI- 
GlON 347 (1994). 
"See, e.g., Ann Barrow, SrillNotBelmuir~~Like Gerrtlmen, 49 U .  ICAN. L. REV. 809, 810-1 1 (2001); 
Susan Daicoff, h k i ~ ~ g ~ t o p a r d r  to CIIRngt Their Spots: S/JottIdLatuJ~~n Chnge?A Critiqor OfSoltctiom to 
Problermr ruith Prof~sionnlinn by Ref.rer~ce to Er,~piricnlb-DeriuedAttonzey PenonalipArtribotrr, 11 GEO. J .  
LEGAL ETHICS 547, 582-83 (1998); William J. W e r n  Don Rof~~ionnl im~ Liternhlre Idealize the Pmt 
and Over-Rntt Civilip?lrZenl~ Vice or a Cardi)rnlVirnte?, 13 PROF. LAW. 1 (2001) (disputing rhe claim 
that "back then"--whensver "then" waclawyers were more professional and more civil). 
'"Thomas L. ShafFer, T h  Gcnrlcn~an h Prof~sio~~nlEtl,ics, 10 QUEEN'S L.J. 1, 11 (1984). 
The 19th century gentleman in Norrli America gave us slavcry, Manifest Destiny, the theft of 
half of Morico, the subjugation of women, the exploitation of immigrant children, Pinkerron 
detectives, yellow-dog conmcu, and the implacable genocide of American Indians. You could 
malw a case.. . that rhe gendcman's ethic is not worth raldng seriously. If the gentleman has left the 
professions, the best ching for us would be ro bar the door lest hc get back in. 
Id.; rre "Lo Thomar, L. Shaffct, Inatrgnml Ho,uardLicI~rnurein Lechlre in Lqal Etbiu: Liyer Profitionnlinn 
maMornlArg-rtntet~t, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393,400 (1991); Profirior~alEldr srpm note 88, at 633-34. 
" Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., In Prabe of n Genrlc Snrrl, Re>rtnrki at the Anrtrrrzl Banqrter of the 
Jonr~mlofLarunt~dReli~o~on (Ocr. 14, 1993). br 10 J.L. Sr RELIGION 279,284 (199311994). 
The acid test of [Tam Shntfcis] reliance an the ethim ofgentlemen is whether it, too, is not 
flawed at its core. Is it not by definition limited to males, and does it have any space for minorities? 
Only one like ShaFer, who by decades ofliving like n gendcman himreifand reflecting carefully on 
that ethic, could have come to the conclusion rhat the ethic of the gentleman-lawyer has greater 
for the subversion of patriarchy than the ABRs mmodcl of professionalism. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
'"ill Hodes poinu out rhat "[tlhe acid test of ethical lawyering is nrely what to do in the Face of 
crisir--a clienr shows you the buried bodies or drops a bloody knife on your desk or commiu perjury or 
desrroys or hidu marcrid property sked for in discovery." W. William Uodes, Accepting nnd Rrjcctii,ig 
Clieatr--Tl,e Morn1 Arltonorrry of rl~e Second-to-r/>~LNt Lawyer in Toron, 48 U .  KAN. 3.. REV. 977, 978 
(2000) (citing the classic mes of Peoplc v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 798 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1975) (buried 
bodies), Srarev. Olwell, 394 E2d 681 (Wsh. 1964) (bloody imife), Nrv. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) 
(perjury), and Bcrlcey P h ~ h o  lo,. v. Eastman KodakCo., 74 ERD. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (worlipmduct)). 
For a wonderful discusion of how social norms affect lawyering, see SocinlNoni~r, srrpra nore 66. 
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What happens when we don't set the right example? We can call doing the right 
thing "behaving like gentlemen," or we can use some other, less "loaded" phrase. If we 
don't exert some leadership and emphasize the role of character in the practice of law, 
some very smart lawyers will continue to do stupid things, and some clients will con- 
tinue to do stupid (or venal) things. Some of these people will even trot our the hoary 
(and discredited) old saw that they were "just following orders."93 
So how do we encourage lawyers to withstand peer pressure and client pressure, 
especially in those grey areas in which the lawyer gives advice alcin to "it's an aggressive 
interpretation of the law" and the client chooses to use that aggressive interpretation, 
even at the risk of later litigation? Remember, we're not tallcing about lawyers who 
deliberately counsel clients to flout the law. Rather, we're tallcing about lawyers who 
say that a particular interpretation could go either in favor of the client or against it. 
Personally, I like Russ Pearce's idea that we create a new Model Rule 1.0. His Model 
Rule 1.0 would provide that "lawyers are morally accountable for their conduct as 
lawyers."9"hat rule hits the question of moral interdependence head on, and it pro- 
vides a powerful reminder chat "just following orders" is the wedcesr of excuses.95 
We can blame part of Enron's downfall on the economy. We can blame part of it on 
corporate misbehavior, on board malfeasance, and on pure greed. We can blame part 
ofit on a structure that allowed gatekeepers and reputational intermediaries-the hoard, 
the accountants, and the lawyers-to rely on the other nvo categories ro understand 
the overall picture ofwhat Enron was doing. We can even blame the Enron employees 
who chose to place too much Enron stock in their own 401(1c) plans, thereby betting 
twice with the same moneY9%ut one thing we can't blame is fate. Emon's collapse 
"See, e.g., Tom Fowler, h - A ~ ~ d e r s e n  nt~di~or~lPJndrdlAide: BOIJ ir1m toldtor/,rrdfiler. How. CHRON., 
Mar. 7,2002, ar 1 ("An assistant to the Arthur Andenen lead pmnerwho handled theEnran accountsaid 
she believes her boss was just following orders when he told workers to desrrny Enron-related documents 
last fall."): Marcy Gordon. SEC, I~$n,ml I%// Sweet Syrtenz Failed to Detect E~rrorr Fnilrrre, Report Fink, 
AssoclATED P W s  NWSWRES, Oct. 7,2002. Westlaw, Allnewsplus Library (Fascow's lawyer contends 
that his client was just following orders). 
" ~usscll G. Pcarcc, A.IodelRzt/e 1.0: Latuyerr are lLlora/4Accorrrrmble, 70 FOMHAM L. REV. 1805, 
1807-08 (2002). Pearce points out that Model Rule 1.0 would not raltc sides in current dispures regard- 
ing the lawyer's role. What ir would do is move the debates regarding the lawyeis monl duties, like that 
between Freedman, who hvors z d o u  representation, and Luban, Rllode, and Simon, who Favor some 
significant limits on that representation, to the center of the bar's legal ethia conversarions. While the bar 
currently pays some slight attention to these issues, Model Rule 1.0 would move them to a more promi- 
nent plsce in the baiz official deliberations and continuing lcgal cducation courses, as well as in the cffons 
of the conscientious lawyer to explore her own moral accounrabiliry. 
" I'm not sure how one might enforce a Model Rule 1.0, bur  at l a s t  Pearce is heading in rhe right 
direction. 
'"ee, t,p., Mark Davis, The Fflloat o f ~  Fallrir Etzron; Too Much Conpnny Stock in ./lll(k); P l n ~ ~ s  Poses 
R i d ,  1Cw. CIT STAR. Jan. 20,2002, at Al; Ibja Whitehouse, 4011k) iYher!llIigbtBe Your 0 1 ~ 1 2  Farrlt, 
Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Jan. 18,2002, Westlaw, Allnewsplus Library. Of course, the freeze on selling 
stoclc as thevaluc of the sroclispiraled downward also had something to do with the losses in the cmploy- 
ees' 401 (13 plans. See, cg., Davis, rnpm; Edirorinl. Enroa nndFroinntier Jrutice Fear o f A t i m  Workerr Sends 
El~ergy TrndirrsFirnt m Nrru York to Filefor Bankntprcy, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dcc. 4, 2001, at DOG. 
wasn't due to a "perfect storm" of mere coincidence-the collapse was caused by hu- 
mans and their hubris. We need to ensure that hubris doesn't blind us to the first rule 
of leadership: It's all about character. 

